Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and multi-dimensional cheap talk, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is always fully revealing. In addition, the final state Nash equilibria have to be essentially quantized when the source is scalar, and non-revealing for the multi-dimensional case. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gauss-Markov source over a memoryless Gaussian channel is considered, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for both scalar and multi-dimensional sources under Nash equilibria; however, the Stackelberg equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources but may be non-linear for multi-dimensional sources. Under the Stackelberg setup, the conditions under which the equilibrium is non-informative are derived for scalar sources, and a dynamic programming solution is presented when the encoders are restricted to be linear for multi-dimensional sources.
of the transmitter is assumed to be affine in the multi-terminal setup. In [14] , the non-alignment between the cost functions of the encoder and the decoder is a function of a Gaussian random variable (r.v.) and secret to the decoder; whereas, it is fixed and known to the decoder in [1] , [2] . It is shown that the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies are affine in the quadratic Gaussian cheap talk setup. The dynamic Gaussian signaling game is studied as an extension of [14] in [15] where the linearity of Stackelberg equilibria is studied. [16] considers the information design problem between an encoder and a decoder with non-aligned utility functions under the Stackelberg equilibrium. [17] studies the central scheduling problem of allocating channels as a signaling game problem between the base station and mobile stations under the Stackelberg assumption.
In our earlier work [2] , we considered both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria of the setup of Crawford and Sobel, and provided extensions to multi-dimensional and noisy setups. We showed that for scalar sources, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds under Nash equilibria, whereas policies are fully informative under Stackelberg equilibria. Static signaling games were also considered, where Nash and Stackelberg equilibria were studied. In this paper, we build on [2] , and extend the analysis to the dynamic case.
B. Preliminaries
A static cheap talk problem can be formulated as follows: An informed player (encoder) knows the value of the M-valued random variable M and transmits the X-valued random variable X to another player (decoder), who generates his M-valued optimal decision U upon receiving X. The policies of the encoder and decoder are assumed to be deterministic; i.e., x = γ e (m) and u = γ d (x) = γ d (γ e (m)). 
whereas the decoder's goal is to minimize 
by finding the optimal policy sequences γ Using the encoder cost in (3) and the decoder cost in (4), the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium for dynamic games can be defined similarly as in (1) and (2), respectively. April 13, 2017 DRAFT Under both equilibria concepts, we consider the setups where the decision makers act optimally for each history path of the game (available to each decision maker) and the updates are Bayesian; thus the equilibria are to be interpreted under a perfect Bayesian equilibria concept. Since we assume such a (perfect Bayesian) framework, the equilibria lead to sub-game perfection and each decision maker performs optimal Bayesian decisions for every realized play path. For example, more general Nash equilibrium scenarios such as non-credible threats [19] or equilibria that are not strong time-consistent [20] , [4, Definition 2.4 .1] may not be considered.
In this paper, the quadratic cost functions are assumed; i.e., c e k (m k , u k ) = (m k − u k − b) 2 and
where b is the bias term as in [1] and [2] .
C. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We show that in the dynamic cheap talk game under Nash equilibria, the last stage equilibria are quantized for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and Markov sources with arbitrary conditional probability measures, and fully revealing equilibria cannot exist in general (see Remark 2.1), whereas the equilibrium must be fully revealing in the dynamic scalar cheap talk game under Stackelberg equilibria.
• We show that the equilibria are fully revealing in the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk under Stackelberg equilibria whereas the equilibrium cannot be fully revealing under Nash equilibria.
• For the dynamic signaling game under Nash equilibria, it is shown that the encoder (decoder) must be affine for an affine decoder (encoder); namely, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps.
• Dynamic Stackelberg signaling equilibria for scalar Gauss-Markov sources and scalar Gaussian channels are always linear, which is not necessarily the case for multi-dimensional setups.
• Further, the conditions for the existence of informative Stackelberg equilibria are provided for scalar sources through information theoretic arguments. Finally, a dynamic programming formulation is presented for Stackelberg equilibria when the encoders are restricted to be linear for multi-dimensional setups.
II. DYNAMIC CHEAP TALK
For the purpose of illustration, the system model of the 2-stage dynamic cheap talk is depicted in 
A. A Supporting Result : A Static Scalar Cheap Talk with Randomized Policies
To facilitate our analysis to handle certain intricacies that arise due to the dynamic setup in the Theorem 2.1 will be used crucially in the following analysis; since in a dynamic game, at a given time stage, the source variables from the earlier stages can serve as private randomness for the encoder.
B. Repeated i.i.d. Scalar Games: Nash Equilibria
In this part, the dynamic cheap talk game with an i.i.d. scalar source is analyzed.
Theorem 2.2:
1 Recall that P is a stochastic kernel from M to X if P (·|m) is a probability measure on B(X) for every m ∈ M and for every i) In the N-stage repeated cheap talk game, the equilibrium policies for the final stage must be quantized almost surely for any collection of policies γ
and for any real-valued source model with arbitrary probability measure P (dm N −1 ).
ii) If the source m k has a bounded support with a density, the first N − 1 stages cannot have fully revealing equilibria concurrently.
Proof: Here, we prove the results for the 2-stage setup, the extension to multiple stages is merely technical, as we comment on at the end of the proof. i) Let c e 1 (m 1 , u 1 ) be the second stage cost function of the encoder. Then the expected cost of the second stage encoder J e 1 can be written as follows:
Here, (a) holds due to the i.i.d. source and the deterministic encoder assumptions. The inner integral of (5) can be considered as an expression for a given x 0 . Thus, given the second stage encoder and decoder policies γ 
x 0 is the expected cost of the second stage encoder, and γ * ,e 1 and γ * ,d
1 are the second stage encoder and decoder policies at the equilibrium, respectively. Since under any equilibrium, the maximum number of bins is finite when the source has a bounded support, there are finitely many equilibria at the second stage which implies that the second stage encoder cost can take finitely many different values; i.e., G(x 0 ) can take finitely many values.
Due to the equilibrium definitions from the view of the encoder,
In a fully revealing equilibrium, the encoder and the decoder policies are injective, thus these policies can be taken as identity functions; i.e.,
Thus if m Hence, the equilibrium cannot be fully informative at the first stage.
For an N-stage game, the analysis for the final stage works identically.
Remark 2.1: The boundedness assumption for the support of the measure P (dm k ) can be relaxed for Theorem 2.2. In particular, a source with a probability measure P (dm k ) that results in finitely many quantization bins in a static Nash equilibrium satisfies the conditions; e.g., when the random source has an exponential distribution ( [21] ).
C. Dynamic Game with a Scalar Markov Source: Nash Equilibria
In this part, the source M k is assumed to be real valued Markovian for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. The following result generalizes the first part of Theorem 2.2, which only considered i.i.d. sources.
Theorem 2.3:
In the N-stage dynamic cheap talk game with a Markov source, the equilibrium policies for the final stage must be quantized almost surely for any collection of policies γ
and for any real-valued source model with arbitrary probability measure.
Proof: Here, we prove the results for the 2-stage games as the extension is merely technical. The expected cost of the second stage encoder J e 1 can be written as follows similar to that in Theorem 2.2:
After following similar arguments to those in the proof of Theorem 2.2, the second stage encoder policy becomes γ 
Remark 2.2:
A related setup has been studied in [12] where it has been shown that there can indeed be a fully revealing equilibrium if an individual source is transmitted repeatedly (thus the Markov source is a constant source). We note that there is no contradiction since for such a source, the terminal stage conditional measure can be made atomic via a careful construction of equilibrium policies for earlier time stages.
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D. Dynamic Cheap Talk under Stackelberg Equilibria
In this part, the cheap talk game is analyzed under the Stackelberg assumption; i.e., the encoder knows the policy of the decoder. In this case, admittedly the problem is less interesting. , the expected encoder cost can be written as
Here, the inequality follows from Blackwell's Irrelevant Information Theorem (see [24] , [25] ; or [4, p. 457]). Thus, the second stage encoder uses only m 1 and x 0 .
Remark 2.3: Theorem 2.4 is not valid if the simultaneous game-play is assumed. It is true that
for a fixed decoder policy, any second stage encoder policy which uses (m 0 , m 1 , x 0 ) can be replaced, without any loss in performance, by one which uses only (m 1 , x 0 ). However, it is not possible to say anything about the equilibrium if the encoder uses (m 1 , x 0 ) instead of (m 0 , m 1 , x 0 ); i.e., the fixed decoder policy may not be the optimal policy after the encoder changes his policy. To provide an interesting example: in the rock-paper-scissors game, the only equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium. For a random decoder policy, the encoder may switch to play always scissors instead of a mixed policy without changing his payoff. However, in this case, the optimal decoder policy is to choose the rock action always instead of a random policy.
Theorem 2.5: An equilibrium has to be fully revealing in the dynamic Stackelberg cheap talk game regardless of the source model.
Proof:
We will use the properties of iterated expectations in the analysis. Recall that the total
Considering the last stage, the goal of the decoder is to minimize
For the previous stage, the goal of the decoder is to minimize
April 13, 2017 DRAFT Thus, the optimal policy is u *
. Similarly, since the actions taken by the decoder do not affect the future states and encoder policies, the optimal decoder actions can be
Due to the Stackelberg assumption, the encoder knows that the decoder will use u *
. . , N −1. By using this assumption and the smoothing property of the expectation, the total encoder cost can be written as
Thus, as in the one-stage game setup [2, Theorem 3.3] , the goals of the encoder and the decoder become essentially the same in the Stackelberg game setup, which effectively reduces the game setup to a team setup, resulting in fully informative equilibria; i.e., the encoder reveals all of his information.
E. Dynamic Multi-Dimensional Cheap Talk
In this section, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk are analyzed.
Since there may be discrete, non-discrete or even linear Nash equilibria in the static (one-stage) multidimensional cheap talk by [2, Theorem 3.4], the equilibrium policies are more difficult to characterize; however, we state the following: 
It can be seen that z − b defines a hyperplane which is a perpendicular bisector of u α and u β ; i.e., the hyperplane defined by the points z is a perpendicular bisector of u α and u β shifted by b. The hyperplane defined by the points z divides the space into two subspaces: let Z α that contains u α and Z β that contains u β be those subspaces. C β and Z α are disjoint subspaces Unlike the different characteristics between Nash equilibria of the dynamic scalar and multidimensional cheap talk, fully revealing characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibrium still hold for the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk, as for the scalar case:
Theorem 2.8: The Stackelberg equilibria in the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk can be obtained by extending its scalar case; i.e., it is unique and corresponds to a fully revealing encoder policy as in the scalar case.
Proof: Similar to the scalar case in Theorem 2.5, the optimal decoder actions are u *
, which effectively reduces the game setup to a team setup, resulting in fully informative equilibria.
As in the scalar case, the equilibria under the Nash and Stackelberg assumptions are drastically different: There cannot be fully revealing Nash equilibria in the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk whereas the equilibrium is always fully revealing under the Stackelberg assumption.
III. DYNAMIC QUADRATIC GAUSSIAN SIGNALING GAMES FOR SCALAR GAUSS-MARKOV SOURCES
The dynamic signaling game setup is similar to the dynamic cheap talk setup except that there exists an additive Gaussian noise channel between the encoder and decoder at each stage, and the encoder has a soft power constraint. For the purpose of illustration, the system model of the 2-stage dynamic signaling game is depicted in Fig. 1-(b) .
Here, the source is assumed to be a Markov source with an initial Gaussian distribution; i.e., 
whereas, the decoder's goal is to minimize
by finding the optimal policy sequences γ 
Note that a power constraint with an associated multiplier is appended to the cost function of the encoder, which corresponds to power limitation for transmitters in practice. If λ = 0, this corresponds to the setup with no power constraint at the encoder.
A. Dynamic Nash Equilibria for Scalar Gauss-Markov Sources
In dynamic scalar signaling games, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for Nash equilibria which is stated as follows:
i) If the encoder uses affine policies at all stages, then the decoder will also be affine at all stages.
ii) If the decoder uses affine policies at all stages, then the encoder will also be affine at all stages.
Proof: A more general result is presented in Theorem 4.1.
Note that Theorem 3.1 does not lead to any conclusions about the informativeness of the equilibrium.
Before delving into the informative equilibrium analysis of the 2-stage signaling game, the analysis of the static signaling game from [2] is refined as follows:
There exists informative affine equilibria in the static signaling game if and only if
Proof: See Appendix A.
Next, the 2-stage signaling game is considered.
Theorem 3.3:
For the 2-stage signaling game setup under affine encoder and decoder assumptions,
, then there does not exist an informative affine equilibrium.
2) if min
, the equilibrium is informative if and only if
, the second stage message m 1 is not used in the game.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The analysis in Theorem 3.3 can be carried over to the N-stage signaling game; however, for an N-stage problem, this would involve (3N 2 + 5N)/2 equations and as many unknowns.
B. Dynamic Stackelberg Equilibria for Scalar Gauss-Markov Sources
In this section, the signaling game is analyzed under the Stackelberg concept. The equilibrium drastically changes under the Stackelberg assumption as shown below:
Theorem 3.4: An equilibrium has to be always linear in the dynamic Stackelberg signaling game.
Further, there does not exist an informative (affine or non-linear) equilibrium in the N-stage dynamic scalar signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption; i.e., the only equilibrium is the non-informative one, if λ ≥ max k=0,1,...,N −1
Proof: Similar to the dynamic Stackelberg cheap talk analysis in Theorem 2.5, the optimal decoder actions can be found as u *
. . , N − 1. Due to the Stackelberg assumption, the encoder knows that the decoder will use u * k = γ * ,d
for each stage k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Based on this assumption and the smoothing property of the expectation, the total encoder cost can be written as
. This problem is an instance of problems studied in [26] and [4, Theorem 11.3.1], and can be reduced to a team problem where both the encoder and the decoder are minimizing the same cost. The linearity of the optimal encoder and decoder can be deduced from [26] .
For the second part of the proof, the lower bound for the encoder cost will be obtained and analyzed. 
It can be seen that 
where
Here, (a) holds due to the iterated expectation rule, (b) holds due to the 
achievable through linear policies where sup I(m k ;
Thus, we have the following recursion on upper bounds on mutual information for the N-stage dynamic signaling game:
. Let the lower bound on
Then the following recursion can be obtained for the N-stage dynamic signaling game: 
. Now observe the following:
= 0 for l < k due to the information structure of the encoder. Then we obtain the following: 
Here, (a) holds since P * , P N −2 must be chosen as 0. By following the similar approach and assumptions on λ, since Now consider the dynamic Stackelberg signaling game with a discounted infinite horizon and a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1); i.e., J e (γ e , γ
Theorem 3.5: There does not exist an informative (affine or non-linear) equilibrium in the infinite horizon discounted dynamic Stackelberg signaling game for scalar Gauss-Markov sources; i.e., the only equilibrium is the non-informative one, if λ ≥ max k=0,1,... 
where the lengths of the vectors are defined in L 2 norm and b is the bias vector.
A. Dynamic Nash Equilibria for Vector Gauss-Markov Sources
Similar to the scalar source case, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under the best response maps for Nash equilibria when the source is multi-dimensional in the dynamic signaling games as shown below:
i) If the encoder uses affine policies at all stages, then the decoder will be affine at all stages.
ii) If the decoder uses affine policies at all stages, then the encoder will be affine at all stages.
Proof:
i) Let the encoder policies be
and B k,i are n × n matrices, and C k is n × 1 vector for k ≤ N − 1 and i ≤ k. Similar to the dynamic multi-dimensional Stackelberg cheap talk analysis in Theorem 2.8, the optimal decoder actions can be found as u *
is an affine function of y [0,k] due to the joint Gaussianity.
ii) See Appendix C.
B. Dynamic Stackelberg Equilibria for Vector Gauss-Markov Sources
Even when the encoder and the decoder have identical (non-biased) quadratic cost functions, when the source and the channel are multi-dimensional, linear policies may not be optimal; see [4, Chapter 11] for a detailed discussion. In particular, except for settings where matching between the source and the channel exists (building on [28] , [29] ), the optimality of linear policies is quite rare [30] . Matching essentially requires that the capacity achieving source probabilities and the rate-distortion achieving channel probabilistic characteristics are simultaneously realized for a given system; this is precisely the case for a scalar Gaussian source transmitted over a scalar additive Gaussian channel. One special case where such a matching holds is the case when the noise and signal power levels are identical in every channel and the distortion criterion is identical for all scalar components [31] . For further discussions on multi-dimensional Gaussian source and channel pairs, we refer the reader to [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] .
It is evident from Theorem 4.1 that when the encoder is linear, the optimal decoder is linear. In this case, a relevant problem is to find the optimal Stackelberg policy among the linear or affine class.
In the following, a dynamic programming approach is adapted to find such Stackelberg equilibria.
Building on the optimality of linear innovation encoders, we restrict the analysis to such encoders.
Our analysis builds on and generalizes the arguments in [37, Theorem 3] and [38] . 
] with m 0 = m 0 , and that the encoder linearly encodes the innovation. Then, an optimal such linear policy can be computed through dynamic programming with
with diagonal K k matrices for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
Proof: We will follow an approach similar to that in [37] which restricted the analysis to a team problem and a scalar channel; [37] in turn builds on [38] , which considers continuous time systems. Since the (k + 1)st stage encoder policy only transmits the linearly encoded innovation by
. . , N − 1 where Σ R stands for the covariance matrix of the random variable R; i.e.,
Due to the orthogonality of m k and y [0,k−1] , and the iterated expectations
, and it follows that
the stage-wise cost of the decoder becomes the trace of the following:
where (a) follows from
, and (b) follows from the matrix inversion lemma,
, W = I, and V = H k . Observe the following identity: 
Then the covariance matrices of the innovations can be expressed as
The optimal encoder chooses A k in order to minimize his stage-wise cost
where (a) is obtained by using (9) . 
Let the value functions be
is the stage-wise cost of the k-th stage encoder. Then,
where (a) follows by substituting C k Σ m k , H k using (11), (b) follows by employing (10) , and (c) follows from the fact that K k+1 and L k+1 do not depend on H k . The equivalent problem of the minimization of tr Σ [40] , and the solution technique can be adapted as follows:
and λΣ w k , respectively, and µ kp
are non-positive for p = 1, 2, . . . , n, then the optimal H k becomes zero; i.e., H * k = 0. Otherwise, check if τ kp /ν kp < 1 for p that makes µ kp positive. If the inequality is not satisfied, again the optimal H k becomes zero; i.e., H * k = 0. Finally, pick p and corresponding µ kp which give the minimum of (
then the optimal H k becomes zero; i.e., H * k = 0. Otherwise, the optimal H k is found as H *
. . , ν kn ), and ζ k is a diagonal
Since the optimal H k always has the form of H * k = Π k ζ k P T k for every µ k = tr λH T k Σ w k H k as described above, then the recursion of the innovation's covariance matrix (10) can be expressed as
Then (12) becomes
where (a) follows from Π 
which makes Σ m 1 diagonal by (13) . By following the same approach, Σ m k and P k are diagonal for
In order to satisfy (14) , since
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N −1. Now we verify that the diagonal K k matrices satisfy the dynamic programming recursion.
For the special case when the channel is scalar, this result reduces to
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. The optimal linear encoder policy is found as A *
, and Π k = 1 and
, 0, . . . , 0 for the scalar channel.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling games have been analyzed. For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we have shown that the last stage equilibria are quantized for any scalar source with an arbitrary distribution, and fully revealing equilibria cannot exist in general (see Remark 2.1) whereas for the dynamic Stackelberg cheap talk game, the equilibria must be fully revealing regardless of the source model. We have also proved that the equilibria are fully revealing in the dynamic multi-dimensional cheap talk under Stackelberg equilibria whereas the equilibria cannot be fully revealing under a Nash concept. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel is considered, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for scalar and multi-dimensional sources under Nash equilibria. However, for dynamic Stackelberg signaling games involving Gauss-Markov sources and memoryless Gaussian channels, we have proved that for scalar setups linear policies are optimal and the only equilibrium is the linear one, whereas this is not the case for general multidimensional setups. Finally, the conditions under which the equilibrium is non-informative under the Stackelberg assumption are derived for scalar Gauss-Markov sources, and the dynamic programming formulation is presented for a class of Stackelberg equilibria when the encoders are restricted to be linear for multi-dimensional Gauss-Markov sources.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Recall that in the static Nash signaling game, the optimal affine encoder cost is obtained as J * ,e = and y k = x k + w k .
